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We summarize a new realist interpretation of quantum theory that builds on the existing physical
structure of the theory and allows experiments to have definite outcomes, but leaves the theory’s
basic dynamical content essentially intact. Much as classical systems have specific states that evolve
along definite trajectories through configuration spaces, the traditional formulation of quantum
theory asserts that closed quantum systems have specific states that evolve unitarily along definite
trajectories through Hilbert spaces, and our interpretation extends this intuitive picture of states and
Hilbert-space trajectories to the case of open quantum systems as well. Our interpretation—which
we claim is ultimately compatible with Lorentz invariance—reformulates wave-function collapse in
terms of an underlying interpolating dynamics, makes it possible to derive the Born rule from deeper
principles, and resolves several open questions regarding ontological stability and dynamics.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this letter and in a more comprehensive companion
paper [1], we present a realist interpretation of quantum
theory that hews closely to the basic structure of the the-
ory in its widely accepted current form. Our primary goal
is to move beyond instrumentalism and describe an ac-
tual reality that lies behind the mathematical formalism
of quantum theory. We also intend to provide new hope
to those who find themselves disappointed with the pace
of progress on making sense of the theory’s foundations
[2, 3].
A. Why Do We Need a New Interpretation?
The Copenhagen interpretation is still, at least accord-
ing to some surveys [4, 5], the most popular interpreta-
tion of quantum theory today, but it also suffers from a
number of serious drawbacks. Most significantly, the defi-
nition of a measurement according to the Copenhagen in-
terpretation relies on a questionable demarcation, known
as the Heisenberg cut (Heisenbergscher Schnitt) [6, 7], be-
tween the large classical systems that carry out measure-
ments and the small quantum systems that they measure;
this ill-defined Heisenberg cut has never been identified
in any experiment to date and must be put into the inter-
pretation by hand. (See Figure 1.) An associated issue
is the interpretation’s assumption of wave-function col-
lapse, by which we refer to the supposed instantaneous,
discontinuous change in a quantum system immediately
following a measurement by a classical system, in stark
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contrast to the smooth time evolution that governs dy-
namically closed systems.
The Copenhagen interpretation is also unclear as to
the ultimate meaning of the state vector of a system:
Does a system’s state vector merely represent the experi-
menter’s knowledge, is it some sort of objective probabil-
ity distribution,1 or is it an irreducible ingredient of real-
ity like the state of a classical system? For that matter,
what constitutes an observer, and can we meaningfully
talk about the state of an observer within the formalism
of quantum theory? Given that no realistic system is
ever perfectly free of quantum entanglements with other
systems, and thus no realistic system can ever truly be
assigned a specific state vector in the first place, what
becomes of the popular depiction of quantum theory in
which every particle is supposedly described by a specific
wave function propagating in three-dimensional space?
The Copenhagen interpretation leads to additional trou-
ble when trying to make sense of thought experiments
like Schro¨dinger’s cat, Wigner’s friend, and the quantum
Zeno paradox.2
A more satisfactory interpretation would eliminate the
need for an ad hoc Heisenberg cut, thereby demoting
measurements to an ordinary kind of interaction and
allowing quantum theory to be a complete theory that
seamlessly encompasses all systems in Nature, includ-
ing observers as physical systems with quantum states of
their own. Moreover, such an interpretation should fun-
damentally (even if not always superficially) be consis-
tent with all experimental data and other reliably known
features of Nature, including relativity, and should be
general enough to accommodate the large variety of both
1 Recent work [8–10] casts considerable doubt on assertions that
state vectors are nothing more than probability distributions over
more fundamental ingredients of reality.
2 We discuss all of these thought experiments in our companion
paper [1].
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Figure 1. The Heisenberg cut.
presently known and hypothetical physical systems. Such
an interpretation should also address the key no-go the-
orems developed over the years by researchers working
on the foundations of quantum theory, should not de-
pend on concepts or quantities whose definitions require
a physically unrealistic measure-zero level of sharpness,
and should be insensitive to potentially unknowable fea-
tures of reality, such as whether we can sensibly define
“the universe as a whole” as being a closed or open sys-
tem.
B. Motivation from Classical Physics
Our interpretation is fully quantum in nature. How-
ever, for purposes of motivation, consider the basic the-
oretical structure of classical physics: A classical system
has a specific state—which we call its “ontic state”—that
evolves in time through the system’s configuration space
according to some dynamical rule that may or may not be
stochastic, and this dynamical rule exists whether or not
the system’s state lies beneath a nontrivial evolving prob-
ability distribution—called an “epistemic state”—on the
system’s configuration space; moreover, the dynamical
rule for the system’s underlying ontic state is consistent
with the overall evolution of the system’s epistemic state,
in the sense that if we consider a probabilistic ensemble
over the system’s initial ontic state and apply the dy-
namical rule to each ontic state in the ensemble, then
we correctly obtain the overall evolution of the system’s
epistemic state as a whole.
In particular, note the insufficiency of specifying a
dynamical rule solely for the evolution of the system’s
overall probability distribution—that is, for its epistemic
state alone—but not for the system’s underlying ontic
state itself, because then the system’s underlying ontic
state would be free to fluctuate wildly and discontin-
uously between macroscopically distinct configurations.
For example, even if a classical system’s epistemic state
describes constant probabilities p1 and p2 for the sys-
tem to be in macroscopically distinct ontic states q1 or
q2, there would be nothing preventing the system’s on-
tic state from hopping discontinuously between q1 and
q2 with respective frequency ratios p1 and p2 over ar-
bitrarily short time intervals. Essentially, by imposing
a dynamical rule on the system’s underlying ontic state,
we can provide a “smoothness condition” for the system’s
physical configuration over time and thus eliminate these
kinds of instabilities.
In quantum theory, a system that is exactly closed and
that is exactly in a pure state (both conditions that are
unphysical idealizations) evolves along a well-defined tra-
jectory through the system’s Hilbert space according to
a well-known dynamical rule, namely, the Schro¨dinger
equation. However, in traditional formulations of quan-
tum theory, an open quantum system that must be de-
scribed by a density matrix due to entanglements with
other systems—a so-called improper mixture—does not
have a specific underlying ontic state vector, let alone
a Hilbert-space trajectory or a dynamical rule govern-
ing the time evolution of such an underlying ontic state
vector and consistent with the overall evolution of the
system’s density matrix. It is a chief goal of our inter-
pretation of quantum theory to provide these missing in-
gredients.
II. THE MINIMAL MODAL INTERPRETATION
A. Conceptual Summary
For a quantum system in an improper mixture, our new
interpretation identifies the eigenstates of the system’s
density matrix with the possible states of the system in
reality and identifies the eigenvalues of that density ma-
trix with the probabilities that one of those possible states
is actually occupied, and introduces just enough minimal
structure beyond this simple picture to provide a dynam-
ical rule for underlying state vectors as they evolve along
Hilbert-space trajectories and to evade criticisms made
in the past regarding similar interpretations. This min-
imal additional structure consists of a single additional
class of conditional probabilities amounting essentially to
a series of smoothness conditions that kinematically re-
late the states of parent systems to the states of their
subsystems, as well as dynamically relate the states of a
single system to each other over time.
B. Technical Summary
Our new interpretation, which we call the minimal
modal interpretation of quantum theory and which we
motivate and detail more extensively in our companion
paper [1], consists of several parsimonious ingredients:
31. We define ontic states Ψi, meaning the states of the
given system as it could actually exist in reality, in
terms of arbitrary (unit-norm) state vectors |Ψi〉 in
the system’s Hilbert space H,
Ψi ↔ |Ψi〉 ∈ H (up to overall phase) , (1)
and we define epistemic states {(pi,Ψi)}i as proba-
bility distributions over sets of possible ontic states,
{(pi,Ψi)}i , pi ∈ [0, 1] ,
where these definitions parallel the corresponding
notions from classical physics. We translate logi-
cal mutual exclusivity of ontic states Ψi as mutual
orthogonality of state vectors |Ψi〉, and we make
a distinction between subjective epistemic states
(proper mixtures) and objective epistemic states
(improper mixtures): The former arise from classi-
cal ignorance and are uncontroversial, whereas the
latter arise from quantum entanglements to other
systems and do not have a widely accepted a priori
meaning outside of our interpretation of quantum
theory. Indeed, the problem of interpreting objec-
tive epistemic states may well be unavoidable: Es-
sentially all realistic systems are entangled to other
systems to a nonzero degree and thus cannot be
described exactly by pure states or by purely sub-
jective epistemic states.3
2. We posit a correspondence between objective epis-
temic states {(pi,Ψi)}i and density matrices ρˆ:
{(pi,Ψi)}i ↔ ρˆ =
∑
i
pi |Ψi〉 〈Ψi| . (2)
(See Figure 2.) The relationship between subjec-
tive epistemic states and density matrices is not as
strict, as we explain in our companion paper [1].
3. We invoke the partial-trace operation ρˆQ ≡
TrE [ρˆQ+E ], motivated and defined in our compan-
ion paper [1] without appeals to the Born rule or
Born-rule-based averages, to relate the density ma-
trix (and thus the epistemic state) of any subsystem
Q to that of any parent system W = Q+ E.
4. We introduce a general class of quantum condi-
tional probabilities,
pQ1,...,Qn|W (i1, . . . , in; t
′|w; t)
≡ TrW
[(
PˆQ1 (i1; t
′)⊗ · · · ⊗ PˆQn (in; t′)
)
Et′←tW
[
PˆW (w; t)
]]
∼ Tr
[
Pˆi1 (t
′) · · · Pˆin (t′) E
[
Pˆw (t)
]]
,
(3)
3 As we explain in Section II E, there are reasons to be skeptical
of the common assumption that one can always assign an exact
pure state or purely subjective epistemic state to “the universe
as a whole.”
relating the possible ontic states of any parti-
tioning collection of mutually disjoint subsystems
Q1, . . . , Qn to the possible ontic states of a corre-
sponding parent system W = Q1 + · · ·+Qn whose
own dynamics is governed by a linear completely-
positive-trace-preserving (“CPT”) dynamical
mapping Et′←tW [·] over the given time interval t′− t.
Here PˆW (w; t) denotes the projection operator
onto the eigenstate |ΨW (w; t)〉 of the density
matrix ρˆW (t) of the parent system W at the
initial time t, and, similarly, PˆQα (i; t
′) denotes the
projection operator onto the eigenstate |ΨQα (i; t′)〉
of the density matrix ρˆQα (t
′) of the subsystem Qα
at the final time t′ for α = 1, . . . , n. In a rough
sense, the dynamical mapping Et′←tW [·] acts as a
parallel-transport superoperator that moves the
parent-system projection operator PˆW (w; t) from
t to t′ before we compare it with the subsystem
projection operators PˆQα (i; t
′).
In generalizing unitary dynamics to linear
CPT dynamics in this manner, as is necessary in
order to account for the crucial and non-reductive
quantum relationships between parent systems
and their subsystems, note that we are not
proposing any fundamental modification to the
dynamics of quantum theory, such as in GRW-
type spontaneous-localization models [11], but
are simply accommodating the fact that generic
mesoscopic and macroscopic quantum systems
are typically open to their environments to some
nonzero degree. Indeed, linear CPT dynamical
mappings are widely used in quantum chemistry
as well as in quantum information science, in
which they are known as quantum operations;
when specifically regarded as carriers of quantum
information, they are usually called quantum
channels.4 A well-known, concrete example is the
Lindblad equation [20].
As special cases, these quantum conditional
probabilities provide a kinematical smoothing
4 See [12–14] for early work in this direction, and see [15] for a mod-
ern pedagogical review. Starting from a simple measure of dis-
tinguishability between density matrices that is non-increasing
under linear CPT dynamics [16], one can argue [17, 18] that
linear CPT dynamics implies the nonexistence of the backward
flow of information into the system from its environment. [19]
strengthens this reasoning by proving that exact linear CPT dy-
namics exists for a given quantum system if and only if the sys-
tem’s initial correlations with its environment satisfy a quantum
data-processing inequality that prevents backward information
flow.
4relationship
pQ1,...,Qn|W (i1, . . . , in|w)
≡ TrW
[(
PˆQ1 (i1)⊗ · · · ⊗ PˆQn (in)
)
PˆW (w)
]
= 〈ΨW,w| (|ΨQ1,i1〉 〈ΨQ1,i1 | ⊗ · · ·
⊗ |ΨQn,in〉 〈ΨQn,in |) |ΨW,w〉
(4)
between the possible ontic states of any parti-
tioning collection of mutually disjoint subsystems
Q1, . . . , Qn and the possible ontic states of the cor-
responding parent system W = Q1+· · ·+Qn at any
single moment in time, and, taking Q ≡ Q1 = W ,
also provide a dynamical smoothing relationship
pQ (j; t
′|i; t) ≡ TrQ
[
PˆQ (j; t
′) Et′←tQ
[
PˆQ (i; t)
]]
∼ Tr
[
Pˆj (t
′) E
[
Pˆi (t)
]] (5)
between the possible ontic states of a system Q
over time and also between the objective epistemic
states of a system Q over time.
Essentially, 1 establishes a linkage between ontic states
and epistemic states, 2 establishes a linkage between (ob-
jective) epistemic states and density matrices, 3 estab-
lishes a linkage between parent-system density matrices
and subsystem density matrices, and 4 establishes a link-
age between parent-system ontic states and subsystem
ontic states, either at the same time or at different times.
After verifying in our companion paper [1] that our
quantum conditional probabilities satisfy a number of
consistency requirements, we show that they allow us to
avoid ontological instabilities that have presented prob-
lems for other modal interpretations, analyze the mea-
surement process, study various familiar “paradoxes” and
thought experiments, and examine the status of Lorentz
invariance and locality in our interpretation of quantum
theory. In particular, our interpretation accommodates
the nonlocality implied by the EPR-Bohm and GHZ-
Mermin thought experiments without leading to superlu-
minal signaling, and evades claims by Myrvold [21] pur-
porting to show that interpretations like our own lead to
unacceptable contradictions with Lorentz invariance. As
a consequence of its compatibility with Lorentz invari-
ance, we claim that our interpretation is capable of en-
compassing all the familiar quantum models of physical
systems widely in use today, from nonrelativistic point
particles to quantum field theories and even string the-
ory.
C. Modal Interpretations
Our interpretation of quantum theory belongs to the
general class of modal interpretations originally intro-
duced by Krips in 1969 [22–24] and then independently
ρˆ
...
p1,Ψ1
p2,Ψ2
p3,Ψ3
epistemic
probabilities
(eigenvalues)
possible
ontic states
(eigenstates)
actual
ontic state
Figure 2. A schematic depiction of our postulated relationship
between a system’s density matrix ρˆ and its associated epis-
temic state {(p1,Ψ1) , (p2,Ψ2) , (p3,Ψ3) , . . . }, the latter con-
sisting of epistemic probabilities p1, p2, p3, . . . (the eigenvalues
of the density matrix) and possible ontic states Ψ1,Ψ2,Ψ3, . . .
(represented by the eigenstates of the density matrix), where
one of those possible ontic states (in this example, Ψ2) is the
system’s actual ontic state.
developed by van Fraassen (whose early formulations in-
volved the fusion of modal logic with quantum logic),
Dieks, Vermaas, and others [25–29].
The modal interpretations are now understood to en-
compass a very large set of interpretations of quantum
theory, including most interpretations that fall between
the “many worlds” of the Everett-DeWitt approach and
the “no worlds” of the instrumentalist approaches. Gen-
erally speaking, in a modal interpretation, one singles out
some preferred basis for each system’s Hilbert space and
then regards the elements of that basis as the system’s
possible ontic states—one of which is the system’s actual
ontic state—much in keeping with how we think concep-
tually about classical probability distributions. For ex-
ample, as emphasized in [29], the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-
wave interpretation [30–32] can be regarded as a special
kind of modal interpretation in which the preferred basis
is permanently fixed for all systems at a universal choice.
Other modal interpretations, such as our own, instead al-
low the preferred basis for a given system to change—in
our case by choosing the preferred basis to be the evolv-
ing eigenbasis of that system’s density matrix. However,
we claim that no existing modal interpretation captures
the one that we summarize in this letter and describe
more fully in our companion paper [1].
D. Hidden Variables and the Irreducibility of
Ontic States
To the extent that our interpretation of quantum the-
ory involves hidden variables, the actual ontic states un-
derlying the epistemic states of systems play that role.
However, one could also argue that calling them hidden
5variables is just an issue of semantics because they are
on the same metaphysical footing as both the traditional
notion of quantum states as well as the actual ontic states
of classical systems.
In any event, it is important to note that our inter-
pretation includes no other hidden variables: Just as in
the classical case, we regard ontic states as being irre-
ducible objects, and, in keeping with this interpretation,
we do not regard a system’s ontic state itself as being
an epistemic probability distribution—much less a “pi-
lot wave”—over a set of more basic hidden variables. In
a rough sense, our interpretation unifies the de Broglie-
Bohm interpretation’s pilot wave and hidden variables
into a single ontological entity that we call an ontic state.
In particular, we do not attach an epistemic probability
interpretation to the components of a vector represent-
ing a system’s ontic state, nor do we assume a priori the
Born rule, which we ultimately derive in our compan-
ion paper [1] as a means of computing empirical outcome
probabilities. Otherwise, we would need to introduce an
unnecessary additional level of probabilities into our in-
terpretation and thereby reduce its axiomatic parsimony
and explanatory power.
Via the phenomenon of environmental decoherence,
our interpretation ensures that the evolving ontic state
of a sufficiently macroscopic system—with significant en-
ergy and in contact with a larger environment—is highly
likely to be represented by a temporal sequence of state
vectors whose labels evolve in time according to recogniz-
able semi-classical equations of motion. For microscopic,
isolated systems, by contrast, we simply accept that the
ontic state vector may not always have an intuitively fa-
miliar classical description.
E. Comparison with Other Interpretations of
Quantum Theory
Our interpretation, which builds on the work of many
others, is general, model-independent, and encompasses
relativistic systems, but is also conservative and unex-
travagant: It includes only metaphysical objects that are
either already a standard part of quantum theory or that
have counterparts in classical physics. We do not posit
the existence of exotic “many worlds” [33–36], physical
“pilot waves” [30–32], or any fundamental GRW-type
dynamical-collapse or spontaneous-localization modifica-
tions to quantum theory [11, 37–39]. Indeed, our inter-
pretation leaves the widely accepted mathematical struc-
ture of quantum theory essentially intact.5 At the same
5 Moreover, our interpretation does not introduce any new viola-
tions of time-reversal symmetry, and gives no fundamental role
to relative states [33]; a cosmic multiverse or self-locating uncer-
time, we argue in our companion paper [1] that our in-
terpretation is ultimately compatible with Lorentz invari-
ance and is nonlocal only in the mild sense familiar from
the framework of classical gauge theories.
Furthermore, we make no assumptions about as-yet-
unknown aspects of reality, such as the fundamental dis-
creteness or continuity of time or the dimensionality of
the ultimate Hilbert space of Nature. Nor does our in-
terpretation rely in any crucial way upon the existence of
a well-defined maximal parent system that encompasses
all other systems and is dynamically closed in the sense
of having a so-called cosmic pure state or universal wave
function that precisely obeys the Schro¨dinger equation;
by contrast, this sort of cosmic assumption is a neces-
sarily exact ingredient in the traditional formulations of
the de Broglie-Bohm pilot-wave interpretation and the
Everett-DeWitt many-worlds interpretation.
Indeed, by considering merely the possibility that our
observable universe is but a small region of an eternally
inflating cosmos of indeterminate spatial size and age
[62–64], it becomes clear that the idea of a biggest closed
system (“the universe as a whole”) may not generally be
a sensible or empirically verifiable concept to begin with,
let alone an axiom on which a robust interpretation of
quantum theory can safely rely. Our interpretation cer-
tainly allows for the existence of a biggest closed system,
but is also fully able to accommodate the alternative cir-
cumstance that if we were to imagine gradually enlarging
our scope to parent systems of increasing physical size,
then we might well find that the hierarchical sequence
never terminates at any maximal, dynamically closed sys-
tem, but may instead lead to an unending “Russian-doll”
succession of ever-more-open parent systems.6
tainty [40]; coarse-grained histories or decoherence functionals
[41, 42]; decision theory [43, 44]; Dutch-book coherence, SIC-
POVMs, or urgleichungs [45]; circular frequentist arguments in-
volving unphysical “limits” of infinitely many copies of measure-
ment devices [40, 46, 47]; infinite imaginary ensembles [48]; quan-
tum reference systems or perspectivalism [49, 50]; relational or
non-global quantum states [51–54]; many-minds states [55]; mir-
ror states [53, 54]; faux-Boolean algebras [29, 56]; “atomic” sub-
systems [57]; algebraic quantum field theory [58]; secret classical
superdeterminism or fundamental information loss [59]; cellular
automata [60]; classical matrix degrees of freedom or trace dy-
namics [61]; or discrete Hilbert spaces or appeals to unknown
Planck-scale physics [47].
6 One might try to argue that one can always formally define
a closed maximal parent system just to be “the system con-
taining all systems.” Whatever logicians might say about such
a construction, we run into the more prosaic issue that if we
cannot construct this closed maximal parent system via a well-
defined succession of parent systems of incrementally increas-
ing size, then it becomes unclear mathematically how we can
generally define any human-scale system as a subsystem of the
maximal parent system and thereby define the partial-trace op-
eration. Furthermore, if our observable cosmic region is indeed
an open system, then its own time evolution may not be exactly
linear, in which case it is far from obvious that we can safely
6III. MEASUREMENTS AND LORENTZ
INVARIANCE
A. Von Neumann Measurements and the Born
Rule
For the purposes of establishing how our minimal
modal interpretation makes sense of measurements,
how decoherence turns the environment into a “many-
dimensional chisel” that rapidly sculpts the ontic states
of systems into its precise shape,7 and how the Born rule
naturally emerges to an excellent approximation, we con-
sider in our companion paper [1] the idealized example
of a so-called Von Neumann measurement. Along the
way, we also address the status of both the measurement
problem generally and the notion of wave-function col-
lapse specifically in the context of our interpretation of
quantum theory. Ultimately, we find that our interpre-
tation solves the measurement problem by replacing in-
stantaneous axiomatic wave-function collapse with an in-
terpolating ontic-level dynamics, and thereby eliminates
any need for a Heisenberg cut.
B. The Myrvold No-Go Theorem
Building on a paper by Dickson and Clifton [65] and
employing arguments similar to Hardy [66], Myrvold [21]
argued that modal interpretations are fundamentally in-
consistent with Lorentz invariance at a deeper level than
mere unobservable nonlocality, leading to much addi-
tional work [52, 58, 67] in subsequent years to determine
the implications of his result. Specifically, Myrvold ar-
gued that one could not safely assume that a quantum
system, regardless of its size or complexity, always pos-
sesses a specific actual ontic state beneath its epistemic
state, because any such actual ontic state could seem-
ingly change under Lorentz transformations more radi-
cally than, say, a four-vector does—for example, binary
digits 1 and 0 could switch, words written on a paper
could change, and true could become false. The only way
to avoid this conclusion would then be to break Lorentz
symmetry in a fundamental way by asserting the exis-
tence of a “preferred” Lorentz frame in which all ontic-
state assignments must be made.
Myrvold’s claims, and those of Dickson and Clifton as
well as Hardy, rest on several invalid assumptions. Dick-
son and Clifton [65] assume that the hidden ontic states
and rigorously embed that open-system time evolution into the
hypothetical unitary dynamics of any conceivable closed parent
system.
7 The way that decoherence sculpts ontic states into shape is rem-
iniscent of the way that the external pressure of air molecules
above a basin of water maintain the water in its liquid phase.
admit certain joint epistemic probabilities that are con-
ditioned on multiple disjoint systems at an initial time,
and such probabilities are not a part of our interpreta-
tion of quantum theory, as we explain in our companion
paper [1].8 Similarly, one of Myrvold’s arguments hinges
on the assumed existence of joint epistemic probabilities
for two disjoint systems at two separate times, and again
such probabilities are not present in our interpretation.
As Dickson and Clifton point out in Appendix B of their
paper, Hardy’s argument also relies on several faulty as-
sumptions about ontic property assignments in modal
interpretations.
A final argument of Myrvold—and repeated by
Berkovitz and Hemmo [52]—is based on inadmissible as-
sumptions about the proper way to implement Lorentz
transformations in quantum theory and the relationship
between density matrices and ontic states in our mini-
mal modal interpretation. Myrvold’s mistake is subtle,
so we go through his argument in detail in our companion
paper [1].
C. Quantum Theory and Classical Gauge Theories
Suppose that we were to imagine reifying all of the pos-
sible ontic states defined by each system’s density matrix
as simultaneous actual ontic states in the sense of the
many-worlds interpretation.9 Then because every den-
sity matrix as a whole evolves locally, no nonlocal dy-
namics between the actual ontic states is necessary and
our interpretation of quantum theory becomes manifestly
dynamically local: For example, each spin detector in the
EPR-Bohm or GHZ-Mermin thought experiments pos-
sesses all its possible results in actuality, and the larger
measurement apparatus locally “splits” into all the var-
ious possibilities when it visits each spin detector and
looks at the detector’s final reading.
In our companion paper [1], we argue that we can make
sense of this step of adding unphysical actual ontic states
into our interpretation of quantum theory by appealing
to an analogy with classical gauge theories, and specifi-
cally the example of the Maxwell theory of electromag-
netism. Just as different choices of gauge for a given clas-
sical gauge theory make different calculations or proper-
ties of the theory more or less manifest—each choice of
gauge inevitably involves trade-offs—we see that switch-
ing from the “unitary gauge” corresponding to our in-
8 The same implicit assumption occurs in Section 9.2 of [29].
9 Observe that the eigenbasis of each system’s density matrix
therefore defines a preferred basis for that system alone. We do
not assume the sort of universe-spanning preferred basis shared
by all systems that is featured in the traditional many-worlds
interpretation; such a universe-spanning preferred basis would
lead to new forms of nonlocality, as we describe in our compan-
ion paper [1].
7terpretation of quantum theory to the “Lorenz gauge” in
which it looks more like a density-matrix-centered version
of the many-worlds interpretation makes the locality and
Lorentz covariance of the interpretation more manifest
at the cost of obscuring the interpretation’s underlying
ontology and the meaning of probability.
Seen from this perspective, we can also better under-
stand why it is so challenging [68] to make sense of a
many-worlds-type interpretation as an ontologically and
epistemologically reasonable interpretation of quantum
theory: Attempting to do so leads to as much meta-
physical difficulty as trying to make sense of the Lorenz
gauge of Maxwell electromagnetism as an “ontologically
correct interpretation” of the Maxwell theory.10 Hence,
taking a lesson from classical gauge theories, we pro-
pose instead regarding many-worlds-type interpretations
as merely a convenient mathematical tool—a particu-
lar “gauge choice”—for establishing definitively that a
given “unitary-gauge” interpretation of quantum theory
like our own is ultimately consistent with locality and
Lorentz invariance.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this letter and in a more extensive companion pa-
per [1], we have introduced a new, conservative interpre-
tation of quantum theory that threads a number of key
requirements that we feel are insufficiently addressed by
other interpretations. In particular, our interpretation
identifies a definite ontology for every quantum system,
as well as dynamics for that ontology based on the overall
time evolution of the system’s density matrix, and sews
together ontologies for parent systems and their subsys-
tems in a natural way.
Falsifiability and the Role of Decoherence
As some other interpretations do, our own interpreta-
tion puts decoherence in the central role of transforming
the Born rule from an axiomatic postulate into a derived
consequence and thereby solving the measurement prob-
lem of quantum theory. We regard it as a positive feature
of our interpretation of quantum theory that falsification
of the capacity for decoherence to manage this responsi-
bility would mean falsification of our interpretation. We
therefore also take great interest in the ongoing arms race
between proponents and critics of decoherence, in which
critics offer up examples of decoherence coming up short
10 Indeed, in large part for this reason, some textbooks [69] develop
quantum electrodynamics fundamentally from the perspective of
Weyl-Coulomb gauge A0 = ~∇ · ~A = 0.
[70–74] and thereby push proponents to argue that in-
creasingly realistic measurement set-ups involving non-
negligible environmental interactions resolve the claimed
inconsistencies [29, 53, 75, 76].
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